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4.1  Introduction 
After liberalizing international  transaction  of financial assets, many 
countries experience large swings in the value of fixed assets, the 
amounts of foreign and domestic credits, and aggregate economic ac- 
tivities. This is true for both industrial  and emerging market  countries 
alike. Notable examples in recent  decades include Latin  America  from 
the late 1970s,  the Nordic countries  in the late 1980s  to the early 1990s, 
and East Asia from the mid-1990s.  The standard  theory interprets  the 
liberalization  of international  financial  transaction  (capital  accounts  lib- 
eralization)  as liberalization  of a particular  trade  -  trade  between  present 
goods and claims  to future  goods  -  which should bring similar  benefits 
as liberalization  of trade of regular  goods. These volatile swings, how- 
ever, raise concerns  about the potential costs of capital  account  liberal- 
ization. 
In a recent book, Obstfeld and Taylor  (2004)  analyze the flows and 
ebbs of international  financial  transactions  since the late nineteenth  cen- 
tury,  and show that  uneven capital  account  liberalization  in the last four 
decades brought mixed blessings to different countries. Prasad et al. 
(2006) summarize previous theoretical  and empirical studies to con- 
clude that there  is no robust  relationship  between capital  account  liber- 
alization and economic growth, and that the benefits appear to domi- 
nate  with strong  domestic  financial  institution,  while the costs appear  to 
outweigh the benefits  with weak institution.1 
How does the adjustment  to capital account liberalization  depend 
upon the degree of development  of domestic financial  institution?  Why 
may the economy with an underdeveloped  financial  system be vulner- 
able to shocks to foreign  and domestic finance? 
In  order  to answer  these questions  theoretically,  we single out the pos- 176  Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki 
sibility of default as a distinguishing feature  of financial  transaction  - 
trade  between present  goods and claims  to future  returns.  For  the claims 
to future returns,  we focus on private debt or equity, and will not ad- 
dress important related issues of sovereign debts, and government 
guarantee of private debts, nor international  flow of technology and 
managerial  capital  (foreign  direct  investment).  With  this focus, we con- 
struct  a model of small open economy in which it is difficult  to enforce 
debtors to repay their debt unless it is secured by the collateral.  Entre- 
preneurs  use fixed asset (land) and working capital  to produce output 
in the following period. At each date, some entrepreneurs  are produc- 
tive while others are not. Here, the fixed asset is factor  of production  as 
well as collateral  for loan. The borrower's  credit  limit is affected  by the 
price of fixed asset, while the asset price is affected  by credit  limits.  The 
interaction  between credit limits and the asset price turns out to be a 
propagation  mechanism that may generate large swings in aggregate 
economics  activities. 
In addition  to fixed asset, some fraction  of future  output  becomes  col- 
lateral  for domestic loans, like project  finance,  or equity. The extent to 
which future  output  becomes collateral  depends upon both the technol- 
ogy and the quality  of institution,  which affects  the development  of do- 
mestic financial  system. We show that, if the domestic financial  system 
is underdeveloped, it fails to transfer  enough purchasing  power from 
savers (typically  unproductive  entrepreneurs)  to investing agents (pro- 
ductive entrepreneurs).  Some funds are allocated to unproductive  en- 
trepreneurs  with inferior  technology,  resulting in low total factor  pro- 
ductivity (TFP)  of the economy. The domestic interest rate earned by 
savers remains low  -  the symptom of financial suppression, and the 
domestic wage and user cost of fixed asset remain low  -  which is the 
symptom of cost suppression. 
Moreover,  we consider  the extent  to which assets and projects  become 
collateral  for foreign loan is restricted  compared  to domestic loans, be- 
cause the foreign  creditors  generally  have more difficulties  in enforcing 
debts in a different  country.  If the collateral  constraint  on foreign bor- 
rowing is significantly  tighter  than the one on the domestic  borrowing, 
then the domestic credit market can be segmented from the interna- 
tional  credit  market  with distinctively  higher  domestic  interest  rate  than 
foreign  interest  rate. 
We show that the adjustment  of the economy following capital ac- 
count liberalization  depends upon the degree of development  of the do- 
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set in production,  and the resulting relative severities of financial  sup- 
pression  and cost suppression. 
When  the domestic  financial  system is poor,  the cost suppression  is se- 
vere with low TFP  under  autarky.  Due to low production  costs, even the 
unproductive  entrepreneur  enjoys high rate of returns  on production, 
which results in relatively  high domestic real interest rate. Then, after 
liberalization  there  will be capital  inflows toward both productive  and 
unproductive entrepreneurs.  The initial boom is amplified by the in- 
crease  in asset price that further  loosens the borrowing  constraints.  But 
when the domestic  financial  system is poor,  the boom is not sustainable: 
the initial expansion of borrowing  is offset by the eventual rise of pro- 
duction costs, and falls in the share of production  of productive entre- 
preneurs  and TFP. 
For  the intermediate  level of domestic financial  development, finan- 
cial suppression  is the dominant  symptom under autarky,  with the do- 
mestic interest  rate  being lower than the foreign interest  rate.  After lib- 
eralization,  there is capital outflow. The asset price falls because of the 
higher  interest  rate  and anticipation  of recession.  This  hurts  the produc- 
tive entrepreneurs  with debt leverage more than the unproductive  en- 
trepreneurs,  and their share of production drops. The TFP,  aggregate 
output,  employment,  and wage rate  all fall. Despite the initial  recession, 
eventually  productive  entrepreneurs  who will benefit  from  cheaper  cost 
of production  will take  over production  of unproductive  entrepreneurs. 
In the long run,  the economy will recover  with leaner  and more efficient 
production  with higher  TFP. 
In order  to address the question of why the economy with underde- 
veloped financial  system is vulnerable to shocks after capital account 
liberalization,  we do two experiments:  the first  is a shock to domestic fi- 
nance, an unanticipated  fall in the fraction  of future output usable as 
collateral  for domestic loans. This is meant to capture  an aspect of do- 
mestic banking crisis. The second is a shock to external  borrowing, an 
unanticipated  increase  in the foreign  interest  rate.  We  show that  both the 
domestic shock and the external  shock generate  falls in the asset price, 
simultaneous  contractions  of domestic and foreign credit,  endogenous 
falls in TFP,  and recession  -  a twin crises  -  in the short run. In the long 
run, however, we find that, only if the domestic financial  system takes 
time to recover,  the economy continues  to suffer  from  low TFP  and stag- 
nation. 
There  is an extensive literature  on the implications  of credit  frictions, 
both domestic  and international,  on international  capital  flows and cap- 178  Aoki, Benigno,  and Kiyotaki 
ital account liberalization.  While the basic structure  of our chapter is 
built upon Aoki, Benigno,  and Kiyotaki  (2006)  to incorporate  the role of 
asset prices in the adjustment  following capital account liberalization, 
our chapter  can be related  to the following three  strands  of literature. 
The first strand of literature  focuses on the direction  of capital flow 
under credit frictions.  Gertler  and Rogoff (1990)  construct  a model of 
North-South  lending under moral  hazard.  In their  model, since agency 
problem  becomes less severe as a country's  net worth becomes larger, 
capital  can go from the poor South to the richer  North.2 
The  second is on the implications  of international  capital  flows on eco- 
nomic  volatility.  Aghion, Bacchetta,  and Banerjee  (2004)  show that  coun- 
tries with an intermediate  level of financial  development are more un- 
stable  than  very developed or  very underdeveloped  countries.  Mendoza 
(2006)  constructs  a small open real  business cycle (RBC)  model with col- 
lateral  constraint  to analyze the role of asset prices  on the sudden stops. 
Although the propagation  mechanism  though the interaction  between 
the asset price and credit  limit is similar  to ours, as is analyzed  by Kiyo- 
taki  and Moore  (1997),  TFP  moves exogenously  in Mendoza  (2006),  while 
endogenously  in our framework. 
The third strand  of literature  examines the relationship  between do- 
mestic and international financial frictions. Caballero and Krishna- 
murthy (2001)  emphasize the interaction  between domestic and inter- 
national collateral constraints for financial crises by constructing a 
model where firms  are subject  to liquidity shock.  Since  domestic collat- 
eral  constraint  lowers the domestic rate  of return  of saving, agents tend 
to undersave  -  they hold too little spare  international  borrowing  capac- 
ity, which makes the economy more vulnerable to adverse shocks. 
Kaminsky  and Reinhart  (1999)  also empirically  examine  the twin crisis: 
banking  and balance-of-payment  crisis,  and found that  problems  in the 
banking sector typically precede a currency  crisis. While our chapter 
does not explicitly  model banking  sector,  it provides a framework  to an- 
alyze why the difficulties  of domestic finance  and international  finance 
interact  with each other  through  the asset price. 
4.2  Model 
4.2.1  Framework 
We  consider  a small open economy with one homogeneous  goods, land, 
and labor.  There  are two types of continua of infinitely  lived domestic 
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The preference  of the entrepreneurs  is described  by the expected dis- 
counted utility: 
^|>-'iogcsj,  a) 
where cs  is the consumption  at date s, and p e (0, 1) is the subjective  dis- 
count factor,  and Et is the expectations  conditional on information  at 
date t  . 
The entrepreneur  has a constant  returns  to scale production  technol- 
ogy combining  land (kt),  labor (lt),  and material  goods (tnt)  as inputs to 
produce  gross output of good (y,+1)  with one period production  lag as: 
"•-UHxKt^i) 
-  (2) 
where at  is a productivity  parameter,  which is known at date t  . Parame- 
ters k and X  represent  the share  of land and labor  in production,  where 
k, X,  1 - k - X  g (0, 1). Material  goods input includes  both working capi- 
tal and reproducible  fixed capital  -  noting our economy has one homo- 
geneous goods  -  and gross output includes output and fixed capital  af- 
ter depreciation.  At each date, some agents are productive (at  = a), the 
others are unproductive  (at  = 7), and the idiosyncratic  productivity  of 
each entrepreneur  follows a two-state  Markov  process:3 
Prob  {at+1  = 7 1  at = a) = 8, and Prob  (at+l  = a\at = y) = nh.  (3) 
Agents can become producers  or creditors.4  We consider  an environ- 
ment in which, because  the production  technology  is specific  to the pro- 
ducer,  only the entrepreneur  who started  the production  has the skill to 
obtain  maximum  output described  by the production  function.  Despite 
this skill,  the producer  is free  to walk away from  the production  and the 
debt  obligation  before  completing  the production.  Besides  the producer, 
there is a lead creditor  who monitors the project  throughout,  and has 
some skill to obtain 0 (< 1) fraction  of maximum output, if he or she 
takes over the entrepreneur's  production.  Although the production is 
divisible,  there  is only one lead creditor  for  each  production  project,  and 
only a home agent can become a lead creditor.  All the other (nonlead) 
outside  creditors,  home or foreign,  cannot  recover  any amount  of output 
and can take over only land as collateral  asset if the producer-borrower 
walks away. Knowing this possibility in advance, foreign creditors  (as 
outside creditors)  would limit the credit so that the debt repayment 
(b*+1)  of the debtor-producer  does not exceed the value of collateral;  that 180  Aoki, Benigno,  and Kiyotaki 
is, the future  value of land,  qt  +1kt,  where qt+1  is land price  in terms  of good 
at time t + 1 and kt  is land put in collateral  for loan: 
W+i^qt+iK  (4) 
Similarly,  the domestic lead creditor  restricts  her loan (bt+1)  so that the 
total sum of loans does not exceed 0 fraction  of output plus the future 
value of collateral  land:5 
&,+i  + *?+i  =M,+i*,  + 6y,+r  (5) 
Here, land represents  fixed asset with limited supply that the outside 
creditors  can recover after default, and k is the share of such asset in 
gross output. We take 0 as an exogenous parameter  to represent  the de- 
grees of development of the country's  financial  institution. 
The flow-of-funds  constraint  of the entrepreneur  is given by: 
c, + qt(k,  -  *,_,) + wtlt  + mt  = yt-bt-b*  + ^  + ^,  (6) 
rt  x 
where wt  is the real wage rate and rt  is the domestic real gross interest 
rate.  The left-hand  side (LHS)  of the flow-of-fund  constraint  is expendi- 
ture;  consumption  (ct),  net purchase  of land [qt(kt  - kt_x)],  wage bill (zvt  /,), 
and material  goods input (mt).  The right-hand  side (RHS)  is financing; 
the internal  finance  from the net worth  -  output minus the debt repay- 
ment to home and foreign creditors  -  and the external finance of the 
borrowings from home  and  foreign creditors.6 The entrepreneur 
chooses the quantities (ct,  kt,  /,, mt,  yt+1,  bt+v  b*+1)  to maximize the ex- 
pected discounted  utility subject  to the constraints  of technology  and fi- 
nance (2 through  6). 
Next we turn to workers.  Unlike the entrepreneurs,  the workers do 
not have production  technology,  nor any collateralizable  asset in order 
to borrow  either  domestically  or internationally.  They  choose consump- 
tion ct, labor supply /,, and domestic and foreign net borrowings (bt+1 
and b*+1)  to maximize the expected discounted  utility, 
£,{!>-' «[c.-p(y]I 
subject  to the flow of funds constraint, 
rt  r 
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b,+1<0,andb*+i^0. 
We assume w() is strictly  concave.  Let L  be population size of workers, 
and v(l) = /1+1/V(1  + l/r|)  where T|  > 0. The choice of labor  supply im- 
plies wt = v'(lt),  and the total labor  supply becomes 
Ut  = Is (wt) = Lw?. 
Foreigners  lend to and borrow  from  the domestic  agents at a constant 
real  gross interest  rate  r*.  Throughout  the analysis,  we assume that  there 
is no limitation  on domestic  lending to foreigners  at this interest  rate,  be- 
cause foreigners  have enough collateral.  We also assume the foreign  in- 
terest  rate  is strictly  less than the home time preference  rate: 
r*  < i  (Al) 
P 
Let Ct,  C\, and C™  be aggregate  consumption  of productive  entrepre- 
neurs, unproductive  entrepreneurs,  and workers,  and let Bt,  B\, and Bf 
be aggregate  quantities  of the other quantity  bt  of productive  entrepre- 
neurs, unproductive entrepreneurs,  and workers. Supply of land is 
fixed at K.  The  market  clearing  condition  for land, labor,  goods, and do- 
mestic credit  are  written  as: 
Kt + K\ = K,  (7) 
Lt + L't  = U(wt)  = Lw?,  (8) 
c, + c; + c? + Mt + m;  (9) 
= x + y; -  (B* + Bf  + b*w)  + -J±i  - 
^ 
-  -  , 
BM + B;+1  + Br+1  = 0.  (10) 
In the RHS  of equation  (9),  the last two terms  are  the net supply of goods 
by the foreigners  to domestic agents. In equation (10), the debt of do- 
mestic agents to the other domestic agents should be net out in the ag- 
gregate,  even though the total  debts of the domestic agents  need not be- 
cause of the international  borrowing  and lending. (Remember  that the 
domestic  credit  market  may be segmented from  the international  credit 
market,  because the home agents face the international  borrowing  con- 
straint.) 
The  competitive  equilibrium  is defined as a set of prices  (qt,  rt,wt)  and 182  Aoki, Benigno,  and Kiyotaki 
quantities  that is consistent  with the choice of all the individual entre- 
preneurs  and workers  as well as the clearing  conditions of markets  for 
land, labor,  goods, and domestic credit.  Because  there  are no aggregate 
shocks, aside from possibly an unanticipated  exogenous shock to the 
initial condition, the agents have perfect  foresight of future prices and 
aggregate  quantities  in the equilibrium  (even though each  entrepreneur 
faces idiosyncratic  productivity  shocks).  By Walras'  Law,  only three  out 
of four market  clearing  conditions  are independent. 
4.2.2  Properties  of Equilibrium 
We now describe  the equilibrium  of our economy.  For the details of 
the derivations,  please see the appendix  to this section.  We  first  observe 
that the domestic interest  rate  cannot  be lower than the foreign  interest 
rate: 
rt  > r*. 
Otherwise,  all of the domestic savings would go abroad,  and domestic 
use of land and labor  would shrink  to zero, which would contradict  the 
market  clearing. 
We start by describing the behavior of entrepreneurs.  The interna- 
tional borrowing constraint  implies that, when the entrepreneur  buys 
one unit of land at price  qt,  he can  borrow  up to the present  value of qM 
with favorable  foreign interest rate, and needs to finance only the dif- 
ference, 
from the other  funds. Here ut  is the required  down payment for the en- 
trepreneur  to buy a unit of land. We can also think  of ut  as the opportu- 
nity cost  -  user cost  -  of holding land for one period. 
When each entrepreneur  chooses the factor  demand to minimize the 
cost of production,  ujct  + wtlt  + mt  for a given output yt+1  subject  to pro- 
duction function  (2),  the factor  demand and the cost function  satisfy: 
K  X 
kt:L:m=  -  : -  : 1 -  k -  X,  and  (12) 
ut  wt 
ufwk  Min  (ufa  + wtlt  + mt)  = ￿￿￿￿  yt+1, 
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for the entrepreneur  with the productivity  ar Because  the ratio  of factor 
demand are common to all the productive  and unproductive  entrepre- 
neurs,  we know: 
Kt  : Lt  :  M, = -  : -  : 1 -  k -  X = K[  : L[  :  M\.  (13) 
Let  Zt  be the total  net worth of all the entrepreneurs: 
z, = r, + y;  + <,,(*,_,  + k',_o  - b,  - b;  - b*  - b*\ 
Let  st  be the share  of net worth of all the productive  entrepreneurs: 
5=r, 
+ ,,E  -s.-Bf  (i4) 
The productive entrepreneurs  would borrow up to the limits of inter- 
national and domestic borrowing, if the rate of returns  on production 
[a/(uktw*)]  exceeds the domestic interest  rate  -  note that the rate of re- 
turn  is the inverse of unit of cost in (12):  Aggregating  the flow-of-funds 
(6) across  all the productive  entrepreneurs,  we have: 
utKt  + wtLt + M, <  ￿￿￿￿ 
g 
￿￿￿￿ 
,  (15) 
1 ￿￿￿￿  ol/(u«w)) 
where the equality  holds if a/{uktw))  > rt,  and the strictly  inequality  im- 
plies (x/(ukw))  = rr The  numerator  of RHS  is the aggregate  gross saving 
of the productive  entrepreneurs,  because  they save P  fraction  of their  net 
worth with logarithmic  period utility function.  The denominator  is the 
fraction  of the costs that has to be financed  from own saving, after  bor- 
rowing 6 fraction  of future  output from  domestic  creditor  at the interest 
rate  rt.  Thus, the productive  entrepreneurs  use their gross saving in or- 
der to finance  the gap between the total cost of production  and the ex- 
ternal  finance. 
While  the productive  entrepreneurs  have a comparative  advantage  in 
production  with borrowing,  the unproductive  entrepreneurs  have com- 
parative  advantage in providing loans. So the unproductive  entrepre- 
neurs either lend to the productive entrepreneurs  in domestic credit 
market  and/or produce  with borrowing  from  foreigners  if the rate  of re- 
turns  on production  is equal to the domestic interest  rate: 
VI  ^ rr  (16) 184  Aoki, Benigno,  and Kiyotaki 
This would hold with equality  when the unproductive  agents produce. 
If (16)  holds with strict  inequality,  the unproductive  entrepreneurs  spe- 
cialize in providing loans. 
Concerning  the workers, they will decumulate their financial  assets 
until they consume all, if the domestic real interest rate is strictly  less 
than the time preference  rate (i.e., rt < 1/P).7 The aggregate  consump- 
tion of the workers  is equal to the aggregate  wages: 
Bu,  = B*«,  = 0/ and Q  = wtLs(wt).  (17) 
From the behavior of the workers, the domestic credit market  equi- 
librium  condition  becomes Bt+1  + B't+l  = 0. Together  with the consump- 
tion function  of the entrepreneurs,  the goods market  clearing  condition 
(9) can be written as: 
q£ + wtV(.w,)  + M,  + M'(  = pZ,  + Bf+1rtBf+1, 
where 
Zt = Yt  + Y't  + qtK-B*-B*'.  (18) 
Then,  from the international  borrowing  constraint,  we have: 
u<K  + wtLs(wt)  + M, + M; < (SZr  (19) 
If  domestic  interest  rate  is higher  than  the foreign  interest  rate,  the equal- 
ity holds as the international  borrowing constraint  is binding. If (19) 
holds with strict  inequality (with nonbinding international  borrowing 
constraint),  then the domestic and foreign interest rates are equal, as 
domestic credit market is perfectly integrated with the international 
credit  market. 
Let  xt  be the excess rate  of returns  of the productive  agent  over the un- 
productive  agent.  Then 
The first  term in the parenthesis  of RHS  is the rate  of returns  on saving 
of the productive  entrepreneurs,  when they borrow  up their  credit  limit. 
The total  net worth of the domestic agents evolve as: 
Z,+1  = (1 + stxt)rfiZr  (21) 
Because  the net worth of productive  entrepreneurs  earns  the excess rate 
of returns,  the growth rate  of the total net worth of the domestic agents Capital  Flows  and  Asset  Prices  185 
depends upon the share of productive  entrepreneurs'  net worth sr The 
share  of productive  entrepreneurs  evolves as: 




(1 -  8)(1 + xt)s,  + n8(l -  s,)  =  ￿￿￿￿ 
fT^ 
￿￿￿￿  -*-*•>• 
The  denominator  of RHS  of the first  equation  is the total  net worth in the 
next period.  The  numerator  is the aggregate  net worth of the productive 
entrepreneurs  in the next period, which is the sum of the net worth of 
whose who continue to be productive with probability  1-8  (from (3)) 
and the net worth of those who shift from unproductive  to be produc- 
tive with probability  nb. 
The dynamic evolution of the economy is characterized  by the se- 
quence  of (qt,  ut,  wt,  rt,  Kt,  K't,  Lt,  L\,  M,  , M\, Zt,  st, xt, Zt+1,st+l)  that  satis- 
fies (7), (8), (11), (13), (14), (15), (16), (18), (19), (20), (21), and (22) for a 
given the initial  land and debts of the productive  entrepreneurs  and for- 
eign debt of the unproductive  entrepreneurs  (Kt_v  Bt,  B*,  and B*').8 
Note that,  after  the initial  total  net worth of the entrepreneurs  (Zt)  and 
the share of productive agents' net worth (st)  are determined simulta- 
neously with the land price (qt  ), the evolution of the aggregate  economy 
at future date t is described recursively as a function of the variables 
(ZT,  sT)  along the perfect  foresight  equilibrium  path. 
Finally,  in the subsequent  analysis it would be of interest  to examine 
the behavior of the total factor  productivity (TFP)  of the economy. We 
define TFP  as the ratio  of total gross output over total input measure: 
y  •*  +  ^  v  1  *  _  ￿￿￿￿  •*  t+i ^  1 1+\  ￿￿￿￿  cyx\ 
w  w  \i-k-xJ 
= ad, + 7(1 -  d,) 
where d,  = Kt/K  = Lt/Ls  = Mt/(Mt+M't).  Equation  (23)  shows that  TFP  de- 
pends on the fraction  of inputs used by the productive  agents,  dr 
4.3  Steady State under Autarky 
Before  looking into how the economy adjusts  to capital  account  liberal- 
ization, it is useful to characterize  the steady state equilibrium  of the 
economy when there  are no financial  transactions  with foreigners.  This 186  Aoki, Benigno,  and Kiyotaki 
analysis  enables  us to understand  how the direction  of capital  flow after 
liberalization  is affected by the degree of domestic financial  develop- 
ment. Here, the home agents are not allowed to borrow from nor lend 
abroad (i.e., b* = 0). Then, because the goods are homogeneous and 
all land and labor  are traded  domestically,  the economy would become 
autarky. 
In the steady state,  all the endogenous  variables  are  constant.  The  user 
cost of land is now defined as the difference  between land price  and the 
present  value of the land price of the next period as: 
u  = qll - 1 
J.  (24) 
Let  us define X = sx, the product  of the share  of net worth and the extra 
rate of returns of the productive agents  -  the importance  of extra re- 
turns  of the productive  entrepreneurs.  Then,  (13),  (19),  (21),  and (22)  can 
be rewritten  as 
k  X  ￿￿￿￿ 
K:L:M  = -:  -  :1-k-\  = K:Lw^:M  + M'  (25)  u  w 
qK  + w1+r>L  + M + M' = (JZ,  (26) 
1 = P(l + X)r,  (27) 
F(X,  x) = X2 + [8(1 + n) -  (1 -  b)x]X  -  nbx = 0, and X > 0.  (28) 
Together  with the other  equilibrium  conditions  (15),  (16),  and (20),  (r,  w, 
q, u, x, s, X, K, L,  M, M', Z) are determined  endogenously in the steady 
state autarky  equilibrium.9 
From the domestic credit constraint (5), the tightness of the credit 
constraint  depends upon both the share of collateralizable  land in pro- 
duction (k) and the fraction  of future  output usable as collateral  for do- 
mestic loan (6)  -  the degree of domestic financial  development. In the 
appendix,  we show that  if the degree of domestic  financial  development 
6 is below a threshold  level 0(k)  where 6'(k) < 0, then unproductive  en- 
trepreneurs  with dominated technology continue to produce, and the 
allocation  of the factors  of production  are inefficient  in the steady state 
autarky  equilibrium.  Intuitively,  if the domestic financial  system is un- 
derdeveloped  (so that  the domestic  credit  constraint  is tight  with limited 
share of collateralizable  fixed land [k] or future output [9]), it fails to 
transfer  enough purchasing power from the unproductive entrepre- 
neurs (savers) to the productive entrepreneurs  (investing agents), so Capital  Flows and Asset Prices  187 
that the unproductive  entrepreneurs end up employing  factors of pro- 
duction with their inferior technology. 
Figure 4.1 shows  the relationship between  domestic  real interest rate 
and  the  degree  of  domestic  financial  development  6 under  autarky 
steady state. When the degree of domestic financial development  is very 
high -  higher than 6* (k)  -  then the economy  achieves  the first best al- 
location with no credit constraint binding.  In such equilibrium, the do- 
mestic  real interest rate is equal  to the time preference  rate, 1/(3. For 
6 < 6*(k), the productive entrepreneurs face binding credit constraint  - 
(5) holds with equality. But, for 6 e  [8(k), 6*(k)], only productive  entre- 
preneurs  produce  (which  implies  efficient  allocation  of the factors of 
production),  even  though  the consumption  of the entrepreneurs  is no 
longer smooth. The interest rate is now below the time preference rate  - 
a symptom  of financial suppression. 
When the domestic  financial system  is significantly  underdeveloped 
with  6 <  0(k), production  allocation  is inefficient, the total factor pro- 
ductivity  in (23) is low, below  the productivity  of the productive  entre- 
Figure 4.1 
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preneurs  a, and closer  to the productivity  of the unproductive  entrepre- 
neurs 7. Then in the steady state, the total wealth of the entrepreneurs 
stays low along with the wage rate and the user cost. The real interest 
rate  is equal to the rate  of return  on production  for the unproductive  en- 
trepreneurs,  (16)  holds with equality.  Because  TFP,  wage rate,  user cost 
and the unit cost of production  are all increasing  functions  of 6, the in- 
terest  rate  is a decreasing  function  of 6 in the region 6 < 6(k).  Intuitively, 
suppression of TFP  and the factor  prices dominates the effect of finan- 
cial suppression here: the lower 6 is, the lower is the unit cost of pro- 
duction  for the unproductive  entrepreneur,  the higher  is their  rate  of re- 
turn  on production,  which is equal to the real  interest  rate  in the steady 
state.  Figure  4.1 describes  such nonmonotone  relationship  between real 
interest  rate  and the degree of domestic financial  development.10 
When the economy starts  trading  financial  assets with foreigners  af- 
ter  capital  account  liberalization,  whether  the economy  experiences  cap- 
ital inflow or outflow depends on the degree of domestic financial  de- 
velopment, 0, for a given share of land in the production.  In figure  4.2, 
the world interest rate is also plotted as a horizontal line. Generally, 
there are three regions. When 0 is very low, lower than 0ir  then the do- 
mestic  real  interest  rate  under autarky  is higher  than  the foreign  interest 
rate. Because  of low TFP  and low factor  prices, even unproductive  en- 
trepreneurs  earn relatively  high rate of return  on production,  which is 
equal to the domestic real interest  rate. Then, after liberalization,  both 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurs  borrow from foreigners, 
causing capital  inflow. 
When the degree of domestic financial  development is in intermedi- 
ate region,  0 e (0,, 02),  then the domestic  real  interest  rate  under autarky 
is lower than the foreign interest  rate  -  the effect of financial  suppres- 
sion dominates the suppression of factor prices. After the capital ac- 
count liberalization,  capital  outflows to the foreign  country. 
For  high values of 0, 0 > 02,  the domestic  financial  system is advanced 
enough so that  only productive  entrepreneurs  produce and the interest 
rate  is high with negligible financial  suppression  under autarky.  With  a 
superior  domestic financial  system, the domestic  interest  rate  under  au- 
tarky  is higher  than the foreign  interest  rate.  After  liberalization,  the do- 
mestic productive entrepreneurs  will attract  foreign funds with their 
large  borrowing  capacity. 
In  what follows,  we focus  our  analysis  on the case  with 0 e (0,  0);  that  is, 
inefficient  production  remains  under  autarky  steady state.  This  case is of 
particular  interest  because  capital  account  liberalization  can  affect  TFP.11 Capital  Flows and Asset Prices  189 
Figure  4.2 
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4.4  Capital  Account Liberalization 
We now examine how the adjustment  to capital account liberalization 
depends on the degree of development  of the domestic  financial  institu- 
tion,  using the equations  we derived  in section  2.4.12  In order  to illustrate 
the qualitative  features  of the transition,  we employ some numerical  ex- 
amples  of our model. The  parameter  values of the model are  reported  in 
table  4.1. 
4.4.1  Capital  Account  Liberalization:  The  Role of Asset Price 
Figure 4.3 shows the dynamics of the economy following capital ac- 
count liberalization.  Before  liberalization  occurs  at time 0, the economy 
is at the autarky  steady state. Here we assume 0 is low ( = 0.2) and the 
world interest  rate  is equal to 1.04.  With  the relatively  underdeveloped 
domestic financial  system (low 6), the autarky  interest  rate  is above the 
foreign interest  rate (due to a severe cost suppression),  and capital ac- 190  Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki 
Table  4.1 
Parameter  values 
K  X  i]  p  a  7  n  8 
0.030  0.12  3.0  0.92  1.10  1.05  0.1  0.15 
Notes: One period in our model corresponds  to a year. Since in our model material good 
input includes  both working  capital and fixed capital, we set its share, 1 -  k -  X, as 0.85. 
The underlying  assumption  is that the ratio of working  capital (intermediate  input) to 
net output  is 1, and the ratio of fixed capital to net output  is 3. When the capital depre- 
ciation rate is assumed  to be 0.1, then the implied  share of material good  input in our 
model  is (3 +  1)/(1  + 0.9 X 3 +  1) = 0.85. The implied  ratio of land in net output is then 
0.03/(0.03  + 0.12) = 0.2. 
Because of our specification on utility of workers, ti represents the Frish elasticity of la- 
bor supply. It is set to 3, in line with the RBC  literature (e.g., King and Rebelo [1999] assume 
4). The results reported are not very sensitive  to v\. 
The discount  factor, p, is set 0.92. One may think that this is too high as a yearly discount 
rate. However, in a credit constrained economy, the steady state interest rate is lower than 
the inverse of time preference rate. Indeed, our model implies  that the steady state inter- 
est rate with p = 0.92 under autarky ranges from 5.5 percent to 8.1 percent depending  on 
the value of 0 under which unproductive  agents produce. 
The four parameters a, 7, n, and 8, together with  k, mainly determine  how  likely the 
inefficient production remains. We set the gap between the productivity of productive and 
unproductive  agents, a - 7, as 5 percentage points. Parameters n and 8 are set to 0.1 and 
0.15, respectively. This implies that in the steady state the fraction of the productive agents 
is equal to n/(l  +  n), and the expected  time that an agent continues  to be productive  is 
1/8  = 6.66 years. Finally, those parameters together imply that the unproductive  agents 
produce in the autarky steady state when  6 is less than 0.64. 
count liberalization  causes capital  inflow.  The land (asset)  price experi- 
ences a large  upward  swing, because  both  productive  and unproductive 
entrepreneurs  can borrow from foreigners at a cheaper interest rate 
against land, as well as because the agents anticipate  that the user cost 
continues  to be higher  due to economic  expansion  (see fig. 4.3,  panel A). 
As in Mendoza (2006),  the asset price serves as an amplification  mecha- 
nism:  the higher asset price  expands the collateral  value and credit  lim- 
its, which stimulates  investment  on working capital.  At the same time, 
the larger  investment leads to a higher user cost for a while, which re- 
sults in a higher asset price in the equilibrium.  At the beginning, the in- 
ternational  borrowing constraint  is not binding so that the domestic 
interest  rate  drops down to the world interest  rate. 
In contrast  to Mendoza (2006),  TFP  moves endogenously  in our econ- 
omy.  On the one hand,  the initial  rise  in asset  price  substantially  increases 
the net worth of the productive entrepreneurs,  who had outstanding 
debts against the unproductive  agents before the liberalization.  On the 
other  hand, the unproductive  entrepreneurs  expand production  by bor- 
rowing from foreigners, crowding out the production of productive Figure 4.3 
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entrepreneurs.  Figure  4.3, panel B shows that,  when 6 is low, the crowd- 
ing-out  effect  dominates  the leverage  effect,  and the share  of investment 
of productive  entrepreneurs  falls.  Then  TFP  decreases  as seen in (23). 
Because  of the deterioration  of TFP,  the initial  boom is not sustainable. 
As the country  accumulates  net foreign debt, the total net worth of the 
entrepreneurs  decreases.  In the meantime,  the international  borrowing 
constraint  becomes  binding,  pushing up the domestic  interest  rate.  Out- 
put starts  shrinking  until it converges to the new steady state value. 
In order  to understand  how the level of financial  development inter- 
acts with asset prices,  figure  4.4 shows the case 0 = 0.6;  a little more de- 
veloped domestic financial  system, but still underdeveloped  relative  to 
the foreign economy (6 = 0.6 <  0a  in fig. 4.1 when r* = 1.04).  With a 
larger 6, the productive entrepreneurs  have larger  capacity to borrow 
from domestic lenders. Initially the leverage effect dominates so that, 
after  the liberalization,  the productive  entrepreneurs  expand their  pro- 
duction more than the unproductive entrepreneurs,  which raises TFP 
temporally,  in contrast  to figure 4.3. Compared  with figure 4.3, the ini- 
tial  boom is longer  with this initial  increase  in TFP,  and it takes  longer  for 
the international  borrowing constraint  to become binding. In the long 
run, the economy stagnates because the production of productive en- 
trepreneurs  is crowded out by the unproductive producers as before. 
Figures  4.3 and 4.4 show that,  under the relatively  underdeveloped  do- 
mestic financial  system, even if the liberalization  causes the temporary 
boom in asset price and aggregate  production,  the liberalization  fails to 
permanently  improve the resource  allocation  and TFP.  Thus, the econ- 
omy will stagnate in the long run. While the long-run implications  are 
similar to those described in Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki  (2006),  here 
(i.e., with fixed land used as a collateral)  the short-run  adjustment  is 
driven by interaction  between the leverage effect and the degree of do- 
mestic financial  depth (see figs. 4.3 and 4.4). 
In figure 4.5 we set the foreign interest  rate  to r* = 1.07  and 6 = 0.06. 
(This  corresponds  to the medium level of financial  development in fig- 
ure 4.2; 6 g (Oj,  62)).  Because  the domestic financial  system is relatively 
more developed so that financial suppression relative to the foreign 
economy  is the major  symptom  of the home economy,  under  autarky,  the 
interest  rate  is lower than  the foreign  counterpart.13  Then,  with the liber- 
alization, the economy experiences  capital outflow and temporary  re- 
cession. The interest rate increases  to the level of foreign interest  rate. 
The asset price falls because the interest  rate  is higher and the user cost 
of the asset is lower persistently  due to recession.  The  initial  fall  in the as- 
set price  hurts  the productive  agents  more  than  the unproductive  agents Figure 4.4 
Dynamics  after  liberalization:  Capital  inflow (high 8):  A. Interest  rate;  B.  Efficient  and in- 
efficient  investment Figure 4.5 
Dynamics  after  liberalization:  Capital  outflow:  A. Interest  rate;  B.  Efficient  and inefficient 
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because  they were leveraged.  As a result,  the share  of production  of the 
productive  entrepreneurs  fall, and TFP  drops,  which deepens the initial 
recession  (see fig. 4.5,  panel B).  However,  the decrease  in production  cost 
in the subsequent  periods helps the production  of the productive  entre- 
preneurs  to recover.  In the end, the productive  entrepreneurs  absorb  all 
the saving and the unproductive  entrepreneurs  stop producing. Thus, 
despite the initial  recession,  capital  account  liberalization  leads to long- 
run  efficiency  and  prosperity,  as is shown in Aoki,  Benigno,  and Kiyotaki 
(2006).  As before, differently  from Aoki, Benigno,  and Kiyotaki  (2006), 
the dynamics  of asset prices  through  the negative  leverage  effect  on pro- 
ductive entrepreneurs  causes a temporary  drop in TFP. 
4.4.2  Welfare  Implications of Capital Account  Liberalization 
A natural  question in the debate is to what extent capital  account  liber- 
alization  is beneficial  for the country,  and how the costs and benefits  are 
distributed  among different  groups. To  answer this question,  we exam- 
ine the welfare  effects  on various entrepreneurs  and workers.14 
For the entrepreneurs,  we measure the welfare effect of capital ac- 
count liberalization  by the average percentage  change of steady state 
autarky  consumption  that  is required  in order  to make  the entrepreneur 
indifferent  between liberalizing  capital  transactions  and staying in au- 
tarky.  In computing  this measure,  we take  into account  the effects  of the 
transition  dynamics  from autarky  to the postliberalization  steady state. 
Formally,  for each entrepreneur  i, we define this measure of welfare 
change  -  called the consumption  equivalent  jx1  -  as 
£0  1  P'  log W) = Eo  £  P'  log [(1 + iL-yc^L  (29) 
t=0  *=0 
where c\ is date t consumption  of entrepreneur  i after  the liberalization 
at date 0, and c? is his or her date t consumption  if the autarky  contin- 
ued after date 0. We assume that at date -1, the economy is under au- 
tarky  steady state. 
We know consumption c\ is proportional  to his or her net worth of 
date t, z\, as: 
c; = (i-p)z; 
= (1 -  m%r\*r\ . . . r\_v 
where r\  is the gross rate  of return  on saving of entrepreneur  i. The level 
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i is productive  at date  t. Then, we  can decompose  the consumption 
equivalent  |x'  into two components: the change in the initial wealth and 
the change in the subsequent  rates of returns between  the autarky and 
the postliberalization  regime: 
log (1 + m/)  = log ( 4  ) + P Z  P'  (P%)j 
~ PK*  " P?)"1  RA]?  (30) 
\2o  /  *=o 
where zj,  is the initial wealth  immediately  after capital account liberal- 
ization at t = 0 and zj4  is the initial wealth if the autarky continued. 
1-8  8  1 
P=  nb  l-nb\ 
is the transition matrix for the productivity shift, and Rt = {log[(l  + xt)rt], 
log rt]f and RA =  {log[(l  + r4)*"4],  log r4} are the vectors of the log rate 
of returns for the productive  and unproductive  entrepreneurs  in the 
liberalization  and in the autarky regimes,  respectively. The subindex j 
identifies  the type of entrepreneurs  (/' =  1 for productive  and ; = 2 for 
unproductive)  at t =  0 when  the liberalization  occurs. Since entrepre- 
neurs can shift from the productive  to the unproductive  status, for our 
welfare analysis of the entrepreneurs, we will need to distinguish  four 
groups depending  on the productivity  prior and at the liberalization. 
For the workers,  on the other hand, we  can compute  the surplus  of 
supplying  labor as: 
Ct  -  V(lt)  = Wtlt  - 
^-y/?^ 
= -^-w)+\ 
from the workers' preference, and the resulting consumption  and labor 
supply  function. Then, we measure the welfare effect of capital account 
liberalization on the worker (ix™)  as the percentage change of the pres- 
ent value of the surplus of supplying  labor as: 
where wA is the wage rate under autarky. 
Table 4.2 reports the welfare  effect of capital account  liberalization 
for the cases corresponding  to figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. The headline  of 
productive-productive  implies  the group  of entrepreneurs  who  were 
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productive at  date 0  (at the  liberalization). Similarly productive- 
unproductive  is the group who switches from  productive  to unproduc- 
tive from  date  -1 to date 0. For  figure  4.3  case (0 = 0.2  and r* = 1.04),  with 
relatively underdeveloped domestic financial system, the entrepre- 
neurs and workers  gain from the liberalization  (in the first and the last 
rows). All the entrepreneurs  gain from wealth revaluation  in row (1), 
while the wealth revaluation  gains are particularly  large for the entre- 
preneurs  who were productive prior to the liberalization  due to their 
Table 4.2 
Welfare analysis 
2-1. theta = 0.2, r* = 1.04 : Capital  inflow (fig. 4.3) 
Productive-  Productive-  Unproductive-  Unproductive- 
Entrepreneurs  productive  unproductive  productive  unproductive 
Welfare gain (ji/)  0.2931  0.2931  0.0493  0.0493 
Decomposition 
(1) Log wealth change  0.53229  0.53229  0.32342  0.32342 
(2) Log rates of return 
(liberalisation)  0.87044  0.63827  0.87044  0.63827 
(3) Log rates of return 
(autarky)  1.1457  0.91355  1.1457  0.91355 
(2)-(3)  -0.27528  -0.27528  -0.27528  -0.27528 
Welfare gain  (5) Surplus  (4) Surplus 
Workers  (|xw):  (5)/(4)-l  (liberalization)  (autarky) 
0.51370  0.48125  0.31793 
2-2. theta = 0.6, r* = 1.04 : Capital  inflow (fig. 4.4) 
Productive-  Productive-  Unproductive-  Unproductive- 
Entrepreneurs  productive  unproductive  productive  unproductive 
Welfare gain (ji/)  0.6761  0.7024  -0.13239  -0.11877 
Decomposition 
(1) Log wealth change  0.75067  0.75067  0.092208  0.092208 
(2) Log rates of return 
(liberalisation)  1.013  0.54983  1.013  0.54983 
(3) Log rates of return 
(autarky)  1.2472  0.76847  1.2472  0.76847 
(2)-(3)  -0.23422  -0.21864  -0.23422  -0.21864 
Welfare gain  (5) Surplus  (4) Surplus 
Workers  (ilw):  (5)/(4)-l  (liberalization)  (autarky) 
0.37307  0.57294  0.41727 
(continued) Table  4.2 
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2-3. theta = 0.6, r* = 1.07: Capital  outflow (fig. 4.5) 
Productive-  Productive-  Unproductive-  Unproductive- 
Entrepreneurs  productive  unproductive  productive  unproductive 
Welfare  gain (n/)  -0.18723  -0.18723  0.0717  0.0717 
Decomposition 
(1)  Log  wealth  change  -0.29909  -0.29909  -0.022579  -0.022579 
(2)  Log rates  of return 
(liberalisation)  1.339  0.86026  1.339  0.86026 
(3)  Log rates  of return 
(autarky)  1.2472  0.76847  1.2472  0.76847 
(2)-(3)  0.091784  0.091786  0.091784  0.091786 
Welfare  gain  (5)  Surplus  (4)  Surplus 
Workers  (jiw):  (5)/(4)-l  (liberalization)  (autarky) 
-0.12289  0.36599  0.41727 
2-4. theta increases  from 0.2 to 0.6  following liberalization,  r* = 2.04 (fig. 4.6) 
Productive-  Productive-  Unproductive-  Unproductive- 
Entrepreneurs  productive  unproductive  productive  unproductive 
Welfare  gain (m-1)  0.77164  0.38446  0.38768  0.084408 
Decomposition 
(1)  Log  wealth  change  0.6435  0.6435  0.39922  0.39922 
(2)  Log  rates  of return 
(liberalisation)  1.0741  0.59536  1.0741  0.59536 
(3)  Log rates  of return 
(autarky)  1.1457  0.91355  1.1457  0.91355 
(2H3)  -0.071591  -0.31819  -0.071591  -0.31819 
Welfare  gain  (5)  Surplus  (4)  Surplus 
Workers  (jiw):  (5)/(4)-l  (liberalization)  (autarky) 
0.69566  0.5391  0.31793 
2-5. theta  increases  from 0.6 to 0.76  following liberalization,  r* = 1.07 (fig. 4.7) 
Productive-  Productive-  Unproductive-  Unproductive- 
Entrepreneurs  productive  unproductive  productive  unproductive 
Welfare  gain (p,1)  0.12446  0.2717  -0.027941  0.099349 
Decomposition 
(1)  Log  wealth  change  0.16057  0.16057  0.014931  0.014931 
(2)  Log rates  of return 
(liberalisation)  1.204  0.84826  1.204  0.84826 
(3)  Log rates  of return 
(autarky)  1.2472  0.76847  1.2472  0.76847 
(2)-(3)  -0.04327  0.079787  -0.04327  0.079787 Capital  Flows and Asset Prices  199 
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Welfare  gain  (5)  Surplus  (4)  Surplus 
Workers  (jt"):(5)/(4)-l  (liberalization)  (autarky) 
0.30302  0.54371  0.41727 
Notes:  Welfare  gain of an entrepreneur  (muAi)  represents  the permanent  increase  or decrease  in con- 
sumption  that  makes  the agent  indifferent  between  liberalisation  and autarky.  For  example,  welfare 
gain of 0.2931  in table  2-1 means  that  the welfare  benefit  of moving to liberalization  from  autarky  is 
equivalent  to the  permanent  increase  in consumption  of 29.31  percent.  See  equation  (29).  Types  of en- 
trepreneurs:  productive-productive  represents  an agent  who is productive  just  before  liberalization 
(thus he is a borrower) and remains productive at the time of liberalization.  Unproductive- 
productive  represents  an agent who is unproductive  just before  liberalization  (thus he is a lender) 
and switches  to productive  at the time of liberalization.  The other  two types are similarly  defined. 
Log wealth change  refers  to the first  term  of the right-hand  side of equation  (30) in the paper.  Log 
rates  of return  (liberalization)  refers  to the second term  of equation  (30),  and log rates  of return  (au- 
tarky)  refers  to the third  term.  Workers:  surplus  (autarky)  refers  to the second  term  of the right-hand 
side of equation  (31),  and surplus  (liberalization)  refers  to the first  term.  Welfare  gain of the workers 
is defined  as the  percentage  change  in the present  value of surplus  before  and after  the liberalization. 
leverage.  The  effects  of the change  in the expected  rates  of returns  is neg- 
ative, as in row (2) and (3), but it is dominated by the positive wealth 
revaluation  effect.  The workers  benefit from the liberalization  because, 
due to the initial expansion accompanied  by capital  inflows, wages are 
higher than autarky  during the transition.  For figure 4.4 case (6 = 0.6 
and r* = 1.04),  productive  entrepreneurs  prior  to liberalization  are  more 
leveraged and own the majority  of land: therefore,  they are the main 
beneficiaries  of the wealth revaluation  effect. Thus, the entrepreneurs 
who were unproductive  prior to liberalization  lose, because the nega- 
tive effect  coming from  the lower rate  of returns  dominates  the positive 
but smaller  wealth revaluation  effect. 
When the financial  suppression  is severe relative  to the foreign  econ- 
omy with the medium degree of financial  development as in figure 4.5 
(0 = 0.6 and r* = 1.07),  the economy experiences  an initial  recession  be- 
fore becoming productive-efficient  in the long run. The welfare effects 
of capital account liberalization  are mixed. The workers lose since the 
loss from the lower wages during the initial recession  is too large com- 
pared to the possible long-run  gains in the distant  future.  For  the entre- 
preneurs that are productive before the liberalization, the negative 
wealth revaluation  effect caused by lower asset prices dominates the 
positive effect  of the higher  foreign  interest  rate.  On the other  hand, the 
entrepreneurs  that are unproductive  before the liberalization  will gain 
since the negative wealth effect is smaller for the entrepreneurs  who 200  Aoki, Benigno,  and Kiyotaki 
were lenders  than  the positive effect  of higher  rates  of returns  in the sub- 
sequent  periods. 
From  these analysis,  we learn  that the welfare of the workers  and the 
entrepreneurs  with leverage  (who are  productive  prior  to the liberaliza- 
tion) tend to be more influenced  by the short-run  movement of the ag- 
gregate economy immediately after the liberalization.  In contrast,  the 
unproductive  entrepreneurs  (who are lenders)  tend to care  more about 
the subsequent rates of returns on saving, which depends upon the 
long-run performance  of the economy. These welfare effects may ex- 
plain why the capital  account  liberalization  tends to be unpopular  to the 
workers  and the credit  constrained  entrepreneurs  in the country  of the 
medium degree of the domestic financial  development. 
4.4.3  Indirect  Effects  of Capital  Account  Liberalization 
Prasad  et al. (2006)  argue  that,  far  more  important  than  the direct  growth 
effects of access to international  capital markets is how capital flows 
generate  a number of what they label as potential collateral  benefits of 
financial  integration.  Indeed, a growing literature  shows that financial 
openness can,  among other  things,  promote  development  of the domes- 
tic financial  sector  and generate  efficiency  gains among domestic firms 
by better corporate  governance. In particular  Klein and Olivei (2006) 
find that,  in financially  integrated  economies,  the degree of domestic fi- 
nancial  sector  development  is higher  than in countries  that  maintain  re- 
strictions  on capital  account  transactions.15 
In order  to capture  the idea that,  by capital  account  liberalization,  the 
country  can increase  the efficiency  of the domestic financial  system, we 
will examine the effect of capital account liberalization  that improves 
domestic financial  system through  an increase  in 6. 
Figure 4.6 shows the response of the economy following capital ac- 
count liberalization  that  simultaneously  increases  6 from  0.2 to 0.6,  start- 
ing from  the autarky  steady  state  as in figure  4.3.  The  autarky  interest  rate 
is above the foreign one due to the cost suppression  with low initial 6. 
Following capital  account  liberalization  and the increase  in 6, the econ- 
omy enters into sustainable  boom with improved domestic financial 
market.  The  asset  price  increases  substantially  and permanently  because 
agents anticipate  higher user costs in the long run. As the domestic fi- 
nancial market shifts more purchasing power from the unproductive 
entrepreneurs  to the productive  entrepreneurs,  TFP  rises permanently. 
From  a welfare perspective,  the improvement  of the domestic  collateral Figure 4.6 
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factor,  along with capital  account  liberalization,  generates  gains for  both 
entrepreneurs  and workers.  Once  again,  the positive wealth effect  of the 
increase  in asset prices  dominates  the negative  but smaller  effect  of a re- 
duction in the rates  of return  for both productive  and unproductive  en- 
trepreneurs. 
Figure  4.7 considers the same experiment  as before  but for the econ- 
omy with significant  financial  suppression  relative  to the foreign  econ- 
omy under autarky  as in figure 4.5: the autarky  interest rate is lower 
than the foreign one. Now most of the costs of capital account  liberal- 
ization  associated  with the capital  outflow is mitigated  by the improved 
domestic financial  system. The asset price, output, wage, and TFP  all 
rise  quickly  and permanently.  The  welfare  level of the workers  and most 
of the entrepreneurs  increases  substantially  (except  that a group of the 
entrepreneurs  who switched from unproductive to productive at the 
time of liberalization  suffer  in a small amount  because  the expected  rate 
of returns  is lower due to the higher  cost of production). 
4.5  Vulnerability to Shocks 
4.5.1  Shock  to Domestic Credit 
There are series of episodes in which problems in domestic financial 
market  and those in international  financial  markets  interact  with each 
other.  For  example, Kaminsky  and Reinhart  (1999)  report  that  banking 
crisis  and currency  crisis  are  closely related.16  Calvo  and Reinhart  (2000), 
in describing  the sudden stop of capital  inflows in Latin  American  and 
Asian countries  in the 1990s,  point out that  the banking  sector  problems 
often begin before the sudden stop and that, in their sample, banking 
crises are often associated  with a reversal  of capital  flow from  inflow to 
outflow.17 
In order to examine how a domestic finance  problem (e.g., domestic 
banking problem) may propagate to international  borrowing and ag- 
gregate production  in the economy after  capital  account  liberalization, 
we conduct  the following crude  exercise:  Suppose that  there  is an unan- 
ticipated permanent  fall in the fraction  of future output that becomes 
collateral  for domestic  borrowing  (domestic  collateral  factor  0), starting 
from the steady state equilibrium under liberalized capital accounts 
with foreign  debt outstanding. 
In figure 4.8, we consider  an unanticipated  drop in the domestic col- 
lateral  factor  8 from  0.6  to 0.2 at date 0, starting  from  the new steady  state 
after liberalization  in figure 4.4. Following the drop in 0, the domestic Figure 4.7 
Dynamics  after  liberalization:  Capital  outflow 0 increases  from  0.6 to 0.76:  A. Interest 
rate;  B.  Efficient  and inefficient  investment 
Note:  When  0 = 0.76,  interest  rate  under  autarky  is 1.07. Figure 4.8 
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credit to the productive entrepreneurs  shrinks together with their in- 
vestment.  The  asset  price  falls,  which further  decreases  the investment  of 
the productive  entrepreneurs  with the leverage.  The  drop in asset prices 
also tightens  the international  borrowing  constraint,  which causes an in- 
crease  in the domestic  interest  rate.  The increase  in the domestic  interest 
rate  further  contracts  the production.  Therefore,  the domestic collateral 
constraint  and international  collateral constraint reinforce with each 
other  through  asset  prices,  which brings  a severe recession.  On the other 
hand, the unproductive  agents will benefit from lower production  cost 
and the higher interest rate (as net lenders). Therefore,  TFP endoge- 
nously decreases,  and the  economy  fails  to recover  from  recession  as long 
as the problem  of domestic  finance  continues  (6 continues  to be low). 
4.5.2  Vulnerability  to Foreign  Interest  Rate Shock 
External  factors  are  often referred  to as a cause of financial  crisis.  For  ex- 
ample, Russia's  default in 1998  caused a large increase  in interest  rates 
for many emerging market  economies. Calvo and Talvi (2005) report 
that interest rate spreads for the major  Latin American  countries rose 
from 450 basis points prior to the crises to 1600  basis points in the im- 
mediate  aftermath.  Moreover,  the increase  in the spreads  was persistent: 
it took  almost  five years  for  the spreads  to be back  at the level prior  to the 
crisis.  In all the major  Latin  American  countries,  the increase  in the cost 
of external  finance  was accompanied  by a decline in asset prices and a 
reduction  in private capital  flows.18  A similar shock contributed  to the 
depression of Finland  in the early 1990s,  as interest  rates in Europe  in- 
creased  following German  reunification.  (See Honkapohja  and Koskela 
1999). 
Here,  we examine  qualitatively  how an exogenous increase  in the for- 
eign interest  affects  our economy.  Figure  4.9 shows the responses  of the 
economy when the foreign  interest  rate  unexpectedly  increases  perma- 
nently from  4 percent  to 5 percent  at time 0, starting  from the postliber- 
alization  steady state with foreign  debt position in figure  4.4. 
Following the increase in the foreign interest rate, the asset price 
drops because the discount factor  of future user costs is higher and be- 
cause the future user costs are expected to be lower anticipating  reces- 
sion. The decrease  in asset prices decreases  the international  collateral 
and increases  the domestic  interest  rate,  leading to drop in output. In re- 
sponse to a 1 percent  increase  in the foreign interest  rate,  the domestic 
interest  rate  initially  increases  more than 1 percent.19 Figure 4.9 
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The drop in asset prices has a contractionary  effect on productive 
agents with leverage,  more so than the unproductive  agents. Thus TFP 
deteriorates,  contributing  to further  decrease  in output.  In  the transition, 
productive entrepreneurs  gradually recover their scale of production, 
since their domestic borrowing capacity  has not changed (0 is still the 
same) and production  costs are lower following the initial  recession.  As 
long as the domestic financial  system is intact,  eventually TFP  and out- 
put recover  to the preshock  level. 
4.6  Conclusions 
In this chapter  we propose a framework  to analyze how the economy 
adjusts  to the liberalization  of international  financial  transactions,  and 
how the economy after the liberalization  reacts to shocks to domestic 
and external finance. Differently from Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki 
(2006),  central  to our  analysis  is the  behavior  of asset  prices,  since the do- 
mestic and international  credit limits depend endogenously on the 
value of the fixed asset. 
Our  model predicts  that the adjustment  of the economy to capital  ac- 
count liberalization  depends upon the depth of the domestic financial 
system. When the domestic financial  system is very underdeveloped, 
the economy  has low TFP  and factor  prices  before  the liberalization,  and 
experiences  a short-run  boom with capital  inflow and asset price hikes 
after  the liberalization.  This  boom is not sustainable  in the long run,  be- 
cause TFP  fails to improve  with the underdeveloped  domestic financial 
system. 
For the intermediate  level of domestic financial  development, since 
the interest  rate is lower than the foreign one under financial  autarky, 
capital  account  liberalization  causes capital  outflow, falling asset price, 
and a short-run  recession. In the long run, the economy will recover 
with improvement  of TFP. 
The welfare of workers and productive entrepreneurs  with the out- 
standing  debt are  more  influenced  by the short-run  fluctuations  than  the 
long-run  performance  of the economy.  The welfare of the lenders (un- 
productive entrepreneurs)  depends more on the rate of returns  in the 
long run than the short-run  effects.  These differences  in the welfare ef- 
fects across  different  groups of people may partly  contribute  to the con- 
troversy on capital account liberalization.  If the economy succeeds in 
improving  the domestic financial  system simultaneously  with the capi- 
tal account liberalization,  then the economy will prosper persistently 
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Our model also sheds lights on why the problems of domestic finance 
and external finance may exacerbate each other through the asset price, 
causing a twin-crisis style recession after capital account liberalization if 
the domestic financial system is underdeveloped. 
Our conclusions  here need to acknowledge  that the scope of our anal- 
ysis is limited  to international transaction of private financial assets - 
private debts and equities -  so that we  have  omitted  other important 
components  of capital flows (such as foreign direct investment and sov- 
ereign debt flows) that are also relevant in many countries' experiences. 
Those topics are left for future research. 
Acknowledgments 
We thank Francesco Giavazzi, Andy Haldane, Sebnem Kalemci-Ozcan, 
and participants at the LSE seminar, ISOM-Istanbul conference, and the 
Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society for useful comments. 
Notes 
1. Peter  Henry  (2005)  argues  that  capital  account  liberalization  should have beneficial  ef- 
fects to the level of aggregate  output,  not to the long-run  growth rate,  and presents  evi- 
dence for this prediction. 
2. For more recent  literature  on the direction  of capital flow under credit frictions,  see 
Sakuragawa  and Hamada (2001);  Caballero,  Farhi,  and Gounrinchas  (2006);  and Men- 
doza, Quadrini,  and Rios-Rull  (2007).  In this chapter,  we focus our attention  on the direc- 
tion of net private  financial  flows. 
3. Bernard  et al. (2003)  use the U. S. Census  of Manufactures  to show that the labor  pro- 
ductivity  differs  across  plans in the range  of 1  /4 to 4 times the mean productivity,  (with 
the standard  deviation  of log productivity  equal to 0.66),  even in the same 4-digit  indus- 
try.  The  difference  is not due to the difference  in capital-labor  ratios. 
This transition  implies that the fraction  of productive  entrepreneurs  is stationary  and 
equal to n/(\  + n), given that the economy  starts  with such population  distribution.  We 
assume  that  the probability  of the productivity  shifts  is not too large: 
8 + m8<1. 
This  assumption  is equivalent  to a positive  serial  correlation  of the  productivity  of each  en- 
trepreneur.  We  introduce  this turnover  of individual  productivity  in order  to separate  the 
distribution  of productivity  from the distribution  of wealth, so that there  are significant 
needs for  external  finance  even in the steady state. 
4. In equilibrium,  typically  the unproductive  agents  will become  creditors  in the domes- 
tic financial  markets. 
5. If the producer-borrower  threatens  to walk away from  production  in order  to renego- 
tiate  with the creditors  before  completing  the production,  it is efficient  for  the producer  to 
pay some to creditors  in order  to complete  the production.  We  assume  the outside credi- Capital  Flows and Asset Prices  209 
tors  are  weak  against  the  producer  and  the lead  creditor  in the  renegotiation.  Then  the lead 
creditor  pays the outside creditors  the value of collateral  land in order  to acquire  the out- 
side creditors'  right  to the land as senior  creditors.  (It  is efficient  to make  the outside cred- 
itors senior  creditors  in order  to maximize  the borrowing  from them.)  After the outside 
creditors  leave, the lead creditor  and the producer-debtor  negotiate.  We  assume the pro- 
ducer  has all the bargaining  power.  Then,  after  the producer  pays 0 fraction  of maximum 
output  and the  value  of collateral  land  to the lead  creditor,  the producer  is allowed to com- 
plete the production  to obtain  1-0  fraction  of maximum  output.  The resource  allocation 
is efficient  ex post. But  the ex ante resource  allocation  may not be efficient  because  of the 
credit  constraint  that  arises  from  the possibility  of the default  and negotiation.  We  assume 
there  is no reputation  to enforce  debts  because  there  is no record-keeping  of the past de- 
faults. Here, we apply Hart and Moore (1994)  and Aghion, Hart,  and Moore (1992)  on 
default  and renegotiation  between  private  parties. 
6. We  assume there  is no rental  market  for land because  of a potential  hold-up problem 
between  landlords  and tenants,  and that  the producer  has to buy land. 
7. We  will later  verify  this inequality  holds in equilibrium. 
8. Noting (13)  has four  equations,  we have fifteen  equations  to determine  fifteen  endoge- 
nous variables. 
9. We  have eleven equations,  as (25)  contains  four  equations,  in addition  to the definition 
ofX. 
10. This property  holds alsoin Aoki, Benigno,  and Kiyotaki  (2006).  Here, on the other 
hand, the threshold  values (6 and 8*) depends upon the share  of land out of gross out- 
put, K. 
11. Thus,  we verify r, < l/£  in the neighborhood  of the autarky  steady state  as we claim 
before  equation  (17).  We  can show this inequality  continues  to hold after  capital  liberal- 
ization  for  0 e (0, 0).  When  6 were higher  than  6, TFP  (defined  by equation  [23])  would be 
already  its maximum  value, a before  liberalization. 
12. As we derived  in section  4.2,  the dynamics  of the economy  are given by the sequence 
of (qt,  ut, wt, rt,  Kt,  K't,  Lt,  h\, M,, M\, Z,, sf, xt, Zt+l,  st+1)  that satisfies (7), (8), (11), (13), 
(14),  (15),  (16),  (18),  (19),  (20),  (21),  and (22)  for  a given the initial  land  and debts  of the pro- 
ductive entrepreneurs  and foreign  debt of the unproductive  entrepreneurs  (Kt_lf  Bt, Bf, 
andB*') 
13. When 6 = 0.2, the steady state gross interest  rate under autarky  is 1.079  and higher 
than r*. Therefore,  when r* = 1.07, the direction  of capital flow depends on the value 
of e  -  capital  inflow with low 0 and capital  outflow with high 0 (but  not too high)  -  as in 
figure  4.1. 
14. Here  we do not address  whether  the welfare  effects  of those  who gain  from  capital  ac- 
count liberalization  offset the negative  consequences  of those who lose, because  it is not 
easy to enforce  the redistribution  in our economy  of limited  collateral.  Also, even if pos- 
sible,  the redistribution  would change  the allocation  systematically. 
15. Klein  and Olivei (1999)  use indicators  of financial  intermediary  development  as mea- 
sures  of financial  development.  They  find  that  the deepening  of financial  markets  goes be- 
yond the level of financial  convergence.  They  also show that  their  results  are  driven  by the 
inclusion  in the cross-country  sample  by Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and De- 
velopment  (OECD)  countries:  indeed,  when they restrict  their  analysis  to non-OECD  de- 
veloping  countries  the  link  between  capital  account  liberalization  and financial  deepening 
is weakened. 210  Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki 
16. See, also, Honkapohja et al. (2006) for the case of Finland, and Englund (1999) for the 
case of Sweden. Ozatay and Sak (2002) point out the fragility of the banking sector as one 
of the reasons behind the 2000-2001 crisis in Turkey. 
17. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) classify banking crises using events-based  criterion. Their 
approach is motivated by the lack of high frequency data that capture when a banking cri- 
sis is underway. Using this approach, they identify several episodes  of banking crisis. 
18.  For the Chilean experience, interest rate spreads more than tripled and the stock mar- 
ket declined  by 37 percent between  the second  quarter of 1998 and the fourth quarter of 
2002. Following  the tightening  in credit conditions,  Chile also experienced  a sudden  stop 
in external financial flows (see again Calvo and Talvi 2005). 
19. The more than proportional increase in the domestic interest rate depends on the share 
of land in production. The larger the share, the larger the increase in the domestic interest 
rate. 
20.  See, for example, Sargent (1987), chapter 1.7 
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Appendix A 
Section  4.2 
In this appendix,  we describe  the details  of the entrepreneurs'  optimiza- 
tion problem  and derive equations  (15),  (20),  and (21). 
Consider the productive entrepreneurs.  From the production func- 
tion (2) and the minimized cost function (12),  we observe that a/wfw* 212  Aoki, Benigno,  and Kiyotaki 
represents  the rate  of return  of production  without borrowing  from  the 
domestic  lenders.  The  productive  entrepreneurs  borrow  up to the limits 
when rt < ol/w^w).  By substituting  the binding borrowing  constraints 
(4), (5),  and the minimized  cost (12)  into the flow of funds constraint  (6), 
we can express the flow of funds constraint  of the productive  entrepre- 
neurs as 
ct + e#  [ 1 ￿￿￿￿  - 
) = zt,  (Al) 
where 
et = utkt  + wtlt + mt 
represents  the minimized cost of production  and 
2#  = y#  + 9#*f-i  -  b#  -  fcf 
represents  the net worth at the beginning of time t  . Also, notice that the 
binding borrowing  constraints  (4) and (5) imply that  zt+1  can be rewrit- 
ten as 
z- 
=  (1-9)^ 
=  f^<- 
(A2) 
(Here  we use (12)  to obtain  the last expression).  By using (Al) and (A2), 





Here the term (l-Q)/(u*w*/a-Q/rt) represents  the rate of return  of the 
productive agents when they borrow up to the borrowing  limits. They 
maximize (1) subject  to (A3).  The first  order  condition  is given by 
1 _  (1-6)  1 
7t 
_  ~ 
P^/a-e/r,EV  (A4) 
When  the entrepreneurs^  utility  is logarithmic,  it is well-known that  the 
consumption  function  of this type of optimization  problem  is given by.20 
ct = (1 " p)zr  (A5) 
Then,  (Al) and (A5)  imply that  when they borrow  up to the limits  the in- 
vestment of the productive  entrepreneurs  is given by Capital  Flows and Asset Prices  213 
et -  utkt  + wtlt + mt = ￿￿￿￿ 
^-.  (A6) 
rt ufuti 
As stated previously,  this equation  holds if a/u*w) > rr On the con- 
trary,  if the borrowing  constraints  are not binding (i.e., the right-hand 
side of equation  (A6)  is larger  than  the left  hand side), a/uKtw)  = rt  holds. 
Aggregation  of (  A6) over the productive  entrepreneurs  leads to equation 
(15).  Notice that  stZt  in equation  (15)  represents  the aggregate  net worth 
of the productive  entrepreneurs.  Finally,  (A3) shows that the excess re- 
turn  of the productive  entrepreneurs  is given by equation  (20). 
Now turn  to the unproductive  entrepreneurs.  They  specialize  in lend- 
ing if (16)  holds with strict  inequality.  On the contrary,  (16) holds with 
equality  when they produce.  Similarly  to the case of the productive  en- 
trepreneurs,  we can express the flow of funds constraint  of the unpro- 
ductive entrepreneurs  as 
z'M  = rt{z\-c't),  (AT) 
where z' and c', respectively,  represent  the net worth and consumption 
of the unproductive agent. They maximize utility (1) subject to (A7). 
Therefore  the consumption  equation  is again given by 
c; = (1-P)z;.  (A8) 
Equations  (  A5)  and (  A8)  imply  that  the  aggregate  consumption  is given  by 
C, = (l-p)Z,,  (A9) 
and the aggregate  saving is therefore  given by ($Zr 
Finally,  by aggregating  (A3),  (  AT),  and using (20),  the evolution of the 
aggregate  net worth is given by equation  (21). 
Appendix B 
Section  4.3 
This section derives the two threshold  values 0 and 0* discussed in sec- 
tion 4.3. (When 0 < 0, the unproductive  entrepreneurs  produce under 
the autarky  steady state. When 0 >  0*, then the productive entrepre- 
neurs  become unconstrained.) 214  Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki 
Derivation of Q 
For  simplicity  of notation,  express  the aggregate  investment  expendi- 
ture as 
uK +  w1+*L +  M  +  M'  =  E +  Ef, 
where E and E', respectively,  denote the aggregate  investment  expendi- 
ture  of the productive  and unproductive  entrepreneurs.  From  equations 
(24)  and (26),  we obtain 
E + E' = (5Z  -  Ik.  (Bl) 
Under the production function (2), cost minimization  implies that the 
expenditure  on land uK  is given by a fraction  k of the total expenditure 
(see equation [25]).  This implies that 
K = -(E  + E').  (B2) 
Substituting  (B2)  into the right-hand  side of (Bl) and solving for E + E', 
one obtains 
Q7 
E + E' = ￿￿￿￿  !- 
JT"-  (B3) 
Here we used equation (24) in order to simplify the right-hand  side of 
(B3).  From  this equation,  we observe  that  when the unproductive  entre- 
preneurs  produce (E' > 0), 
E< ￿￿￿￿  ?5_.  (B4) 
Notice that r = y/(uKwx)  when E' > 0 (see equation [16]).  In this case, 
from  equation (15),  E is given by 
psZ 
Substituting  (B5)  into (B4),  we obtain 
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Notice that  s is given by X/x. From  (16)  and (20)  evaluated  at the steady 
state,  x is given by 
a -  y 
x-T^' 
a -  y  (B7) 
and r is given by (27)  as 
By using (B7)  and (B8),  we can express (B6)  in terms  of X as 
G(X)  -  0(k -  1)X2 
+  1 + P(k -  1) + -^^p  X -  ^-  ^-(1  -  P) < 0.  (B9) 
In addition to this, for q to be finite in the steady state, we need r > 1. 
From  (B8),  this requires 
X < P"1  -  1.  (BIO) 
Since function G(X)  satisfies G(p"1  -  1) >_0 and G(0) < 0, there exists 
unique X such that  0 < X < p"1  - 1 and G(X)  = 0. 
What we have shown so far is that E' > 0 implies G(X) < 0 in the 
autarky steady state. Finally, from equation (28), we observe that if 
F[X,  (a - 7)/(7 - 0a)] > 0, we have G(X)  < 0. It is shown that  F[X,  (a - y)/ 
(7 - 0a)] >0  holds if 
_7  a-7  (l-8)X  + n8  /  x 
Equation  (Bll) defines the threshold value 6 discussed in section 4.3. 
Equation  (B9) implies that dX/dn <  0, and (Bll) implies dQ/dX >  0, 
therefore  d0/dK<O. 
Derivation of Q 
In the steady state where the productive entrepreneurs  are uncon- 
strained,  r = a/(uKwx).  Then,  from  equation  (20),  the excess return  x = 0 
in this steady state.  Then,  (27)  and (28)  imply that r = P"1.  Together  with 
these facts,  the transition  equation  of st  implies that  s = n/(l  + n),  which 
is equal to the fraction  of the number of the productive entrepreneurs 
(see note 3). The  productive  entrepreneurs  are unconstrained  when 216  Aoki, Benigno,  and Kiyotaki 
n 







r  uKwk 
Since E' = 0 in this steady state,  equation  (B3)  becomes 
pz  pz 
r-1  (1-P) 
where we used r = P"1.  By substituting  (B13)  into (B12)  and solving for 





This defines 0* in section  4.3. 